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Abstract
There is a great concern about the potential for people to leak private information on social
networks. There are many anecdotal examples of this, but few quantitative studies. This
research explores the activity of sharing mobile numbers on OSNs, in particular via public
posts. In this work, we understand the characteristics and risks of mobile numbers sharing
behaviour on OSNs either via profile or public posts and focus on Indian mobile numbers. We
collected 76,347 unique mobile numbers posted by 85,905 users on Twitter and Facebook and
analyzed 2,997 numbers, prefixed with +91. We observed that most users shared their own
mobile numbers to spread urgent information; and to market products, IT facilities and escort
business. Fewer females users shared mobile numbers on Online Social Networks. Users utilized
other social networking platforms and third party applications like Twitterfeed and TweetDeck,
to post mobile numbers on multiple OSNs. In contradiction to the user’s perception of numbers
spreading quickly on OSN, we observed that except for emergency, most numbers did not diffuse
deep.
To assess risks associated with mobile numbers exposed on OSNs, we used numbers to gain
sensitive information about their owners (e.g. name, Voter ID) by collating publicly available
data from OSNs, Truecaller, Open government data repository (OCEAN). On using the numbers
on WhatApp, we obtained a myriad of sensitive details (relationship status, BBM pins, travel
plans) of the mobile number owner. We communicated the observed risks to the owners by calling
them on their mobile number. Few users were surprised to know about the online presence of
their number, while few users intentionally posted it online for business purposes. 1 We observed
that 38.3% of users who were unaware of the online presence of their number have posted their
number themselves on the social network. With these observations, we highlight that there is
a need to monitor leakage of mobile numbers via profile and public posts. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first exploratory study to critically investigate the exposure of Indian
mobile numbers on OSNs.
1Call Me MayBe: Understanding Nature and Risks of Sharing Mobile Numbers on Online Social Networks,
Conference on Online Social Networks (COSN) 2013
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Today, Online Social Networks (OSNs) have facilitated their users with variety of services. Users
can easily connect to new people and re-connect to old friends, receive live feeds of their friends’
activity, and share multimedia content in controlled and restrictive ways. These services have
attracted users to spend substantial time (27% of their online time) on OSNs [10]. Users generate
voluminous new content on OSNs, for instance, 46% of adult Internet users post original photos
or videos that they themselves have created [15]. User Generated Content (UGC) on online
social networks is observed to have high similarities with offline interactions of users [36, 38].
Therefore, concerns have been raised on (un)intentional mention of one’s sensitive information
such as age, sexual orientation, travel patterns, credit card details, health records on online
profile or posts [22,25,30,41].
Phone (Mobile) number is an example of identifiable information with which a real-world indi-
vidual can be associated uniquely, in most cases [25,45]. The associated individual can become
an easy target for SMS and phone-based phishing scams [1], spam SMSs [7], spam calls [9],
which may lead to annoyance, disturbance, stalking and denial of service. Such attacks can be
made impactful with easy access to large number of mobile numbers shared publicly on OSNs.
Mobile numbers can be shared either via profile attributes [20] or via posts (see Figure 1.1(a)).
Auxiliary details of mobile number owners shared along with the mobile numbers, or collected
otherwise, can help attackers to launch targeted attacks against them [13]. Figure 1.1(a) shows
an example where a user posted his own mobile number on Twitter, while complaining to his
bank, and revealed his customer number too. Figure 1.1(c) shows an example where a user
posted some other girl’s mobile number in an attempt to deface her, he also posted the girl’s
name, her school’s name and the city where she lived. Direct exposure of mobile numbers to
unintended audience also amplifies the risk. Figure 1.1(b) shows an example where the number
posted by the user is re-tweeted and becomes available to unintended audience.
To examine the necessity of safeguard methods, which can be used to prevent public exposure of
users’ mobile numbers either via profile or posts, in this work we make an attempt to comprehend
mobile number sharing behavior on OSNs, and the gravity of associated risks.
India has been a popular venue for mobile and phone frauds [3,6], owing to huge telecom industry.
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(a) User posts his own mobile number on
Twitter, along with auxiliary information
such as bank name and customer number.
(b) Exposure of mobile number to unin-
tended audience.
(c) User expose some other person’s mobile number on Facebook, along
with auxiliary information such as her name, her school’s name and
the city where she lives.
Figure 1.1: Public exposure of mobile numbers, along with axillary information
India has the second largest mobile network with 919.17 million subscribers by Feb 2013. 1 We
therefore, focus on exposure of Indian mobile numbers in this work. We explore why, how
and whereabouts of Indian mobile numbers shared on two most popular OSNs – Facebook and
Twitter [8]. An Indian mobile number can be used to reveal critical information about its owner
such as name, age, location, which may invite targeted identity attacks. We communicate the
perceived risks of sharing mobile numbers online to their owners by calling them on their mobile
numbers and recording their reaction during the call.
1.1 Organization
The report is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents related work on privacy leaks on OSNs,
and highlights research gaps. Chapter 3 enumerates contributions of the report, Chapter 4
describes the methodology we followed to collect mobile numbers shared on social networks.
Chapter 5 elaborates the analysis and characteristics of leaked mobile number on OSNs. Chap-
ter 6 discusses if mobile numbers can be exploited to disclose other sensitive information of their
owners. Chapter 7 presents quick summary of the report and a discussion on the applicability
of the results and presents future directions, and some limitations of our work.
1http://www.trai.gov.in/trai/upload/PressReleases/566/pr25apr08no43.pdf
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Chapter 2
Related Work
To position this work, here is a brief overview of related work on understanding disclosure of
identifiable information behaviour, risks associated with it and possible countermeasures of such
disclosures.
2.1 Identity information and its disclosure on online social net-
works
On an online social network, a user is defined by a set of attributes e.g. name, age, education, and
friendship network. A user’s attributes can be classified into three sub categories – identifying,
quasi-identifying and sensitive attributes [45]. Identifying attributes connect an online user
account to a unique real-world entity, for instance, email address. Quasi-identifying attributes
are a set of attributes which when combined together with each other, connect to a unique real-
world entity. Gender, zip code, and birthdate are quasi-identifying attributes, which together
deanonymized 87% of Americans [39]. Sensitive attributes are user’s characteristics which she
intends to hide and does not wish to make them public, for example, health records, sexual
orientation, current location. In this report we refer to identifying attributes or quasi-identifying
attributes as Personally Identifiable Information (PII). It is important to note that PII is an ever
expanding category. Ten years ago, identifiers like Social Security Numbers were considered as
PII but now literature has provided evidence of other features like movie rating being a potential
PII [33].
Researchers have widely studied leakage of PII and sensitive attributes on OSNs e.g. email
address [17], age [22], gender [19], travel patterns [41], phone numbers [29], and group member-
ships [44]. Magno et al. in their work on characterization of Google+ social network, observed
many users shared mobile numbers as their profile attribute. They observed that single Indian
males shared most mobile numbers [29]. In our work, we attempt to dive deeper to understand
the other characteristics of exposed Indian mobile numbers on OSNs.
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2.2 Consequences of identity information disclosure on online
social networks
Researchers have also discussed the possible outcomes of leakage of PII and sensitive attributes.
Jagatic et al in their work demonstrated how publicaly available personal information revealed
on online social networks, can be exploited for social phishing [24]. Besides this, PII and
sensitive attribute leaks may further support identity disclosure attacks [42], linkage attacks [20],
and privacy attacks [30, 41]. Disclosed friendship relations of a user can be used to deploy an
automated identity theft attack [18]. Particularly information like mobile numbers can solely be
used to exploit smartphone messaging services (which uses mobile numbers for authentication
e.g. WhatsApp), and hence execute impersonation attack, SMS spam attack, Phone number
enumeration attack and Status message forgery attack [37]. VoIP applications like Viber 1,
Voypi 2, Forfone 3, EasyTalk, Wowtalk 4 are also vulnerable to such attacks, when an attacker
just have a mobile number in hand [37].
On the flip side, mobile numbers themselves have been used to integrate all accounts on different
smartphone messaging services like WeChat 5 and MiTalk 6 associated to a number, and bringing
out more comprehensive information about mobile number users in China [21]. However in
this study we try to understand the comprehensiveness of information one can extract from a
popular smartphone messaging service - WhatsApp using Indian mobile numbers leaked from
Online Social Media.
Apart from risks associated with attribute leakage, possible risks associated with aggregation
of PII and sensitive attributes from multiple social networks, have been explored in the litera-
ture [20, 23, 31]. Krishnamurthy pointed in his work that auxiliary information collected from
online sources could help in connecting an online profile uniquely to an offline entity [26]. In
this work, we intend to explore the viability of the opinion. We exploit Indian mobile numbers
posted on OSNs and attempt to understand if mobile numbers can be used to gather wider
profile (e.g. name, location, age) of their owners.
2.3 Communicating the risk of identity information disclosure
Krishnamurthy suggested that data augmentation privacy leaks could be prevented via alert-
ing users about dispersive information sharing vulnerabilities. We follow the suggestion and
1Viber. http://www.viber.com/
2Voypi. http://voypi.com/
3Forfone. http://www.forfone.com/
4Wowtalk. http://www.wowtalk.org/
5Wechat. http://weixin.qq.com
6Mitalk messenger. http://www.miliao.com/
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attempt to communicate risks of online sharing of mobile numbers to their owners. Researchers
have attempted to send Short Message Service (SMS) to mobile number owners [11], or publicly
display the BBM pins or anonymized mobile numbers with the online profiles to embarrass the
users [12, 16]. In this work, we communicated the risks by calling a sample of users (2,492)
whose mobile numbers are available on social networks, via an Interactive Voice Response Sys-
tem (IVR). We chose IVR to ensure quick reachability of the risk communication message to
the number owners. We captured every reaction of the users, when informed about the risks
associated with sharing mobile numbers on OSNs and analyzed their responses.
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Chapter 3
Contributions
To understand the nature of mobile number sharing phenomenon on Online Social Networks and
its associated risks, we do an intense analytical study. The major observations and contributions
of the study are:
1. We observed Emergency, Marketing, Entertainment and Escort business were major con-
texts on Twitter however the context of marketing of IT facilities was observed on Face-
book, when a user shared mobile number on OSNs.
2. We found that users shared their own mobile numbers on OSNs more often than sharing
other person’s mobile number; and users of metropolitan cities in India actively posted
mobile numbers on OSNs than other locations in India.
3. We showed that users post mobile numbers on multiple OSNs simultaneously, evident by
the use of other social networks and third party applications to post content on Twitter
and Facebook. We also observed that mobile numbers diffused deeper in Twitter when
shared in emergency context than in other contexts.
4. We practically demonstrated the capability of an attacker to gain more comprehensive
information about a user by using his mobile number as a starting point. We showed how
leaked mobile numbers can be exploited to expose sensitive details of their owners such as
number, age, voter ID, family details, complete address, and online activity.
5. Our experiments show that address book resolution feature, adopted by many smart phone
messaging/VoIP applications today, can be exploited to link mobile numbers leaked from
OSN profile with the corresponding profile on the messaging application and gain a wider
profile of the mobile number owner. The experiment also showed how one can track when
was the mobile number owner last online, hence a privacy breach for him.
6. We proposed a systematic approach for Risk Communication. The risks of sharing of
mobile numbers online, was communicated to their owners by calling them using an IVR
system. We observed that 107 users were unaware of the online presence of their number,
6
while, few were aware and told us that they posted the number intentionally for business
purposes.
7. We found that out of 107 users who did not know that their number can be leaked, 38.3%
have posted their number themselves on the OSNs.
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Chapter 4
Methodology
We deployed an intelligent three stage socio-computational system to collect data suitable for
analysis. The three stages of the system are – keyword selection, data collection and data
validation (see Figure 4.1). We collected Indian mobile numbers shared through posts or user
description on two major and popular online social networks in India and across the globe –
Facebook and Twitter.
Figure 4.1: Data collection methodology to gather public profiles and posts which shared Indian mobile
numbers on OSNs.
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4.1 Keyword selection
A pre-requisite to collect and filter public posts and tweets with a mobile number, was to select
a set of relevant keywords. To create the keyword list, we surveyed a set of OSN users in
IIIT-Delhi 1 to determine possible keywords they would use while sharing a mobile number
on OSNs. We selected most commonly listed words for our initial set of 50 keywords such as
mobile number, contact us, call me. With the initial set of keywords, we collected 1,525 public
tweets using Twitter Streaming API 2 and 1,000 public posts using Facebook Graph API. 3 We
used the collected posts to identify other common keywords present when mobile numbers were
shared (adapting a standard technique of query expansion from Information Retrieval [43]). We
tokenized the posts, removed stop words and added most frequent words to expand the seed
keyword set size to 278. Complete set of keywords are listed in Appendix (Table 7.1). Similar
approach was used by Mao et al. to gather tweets with required contexts [30].
4.2 Data collection
We used the final set of keywords to collect public English posts and bio 4 which shared mobile
numbers, using Twitter Streaming API and Facebook Graph API. We started our data collection
from Facebook on November 16, 2012 and ended on April 20, 2013, while we started our data
collection from Twitter on October 12, 2012 and ended on April 20, 2013. We stored bio
descriptions and public posts which shared mobile numbers on OSNs, along with profiles of the
users who shared the number either via bio or public post.
To tag Indian mobile numbers in users’ posts and users’ bio, we exploited the standard convention
and structure of an Indian mobile number. It is a 10 digit number, where first digit should start
with either 9 or 8 or 7. It can be prefixed with +91 or 0, where +91 is a country code and
0 is a trunk prefix. 5 We used rule-based named entity recognition [32] and created a set of
regular expression rules which captured Indian mobile number structure, to filter out Indian
mobile numbers from posts and bio of users. We further observed that most users post Indian
mobile numbers in different patterns (see Figure 4.2). We modified our regular expression
rules to capture all possible ways of posting an Indian mobile number on social networks. We
categorized Indian numbers prefixed with +91 as “Category +91” numbers (see Figure 4.2(b)),
prefixed with 0 as “Category 0” (see Figure 4.2(a)), and prefixed with nothing as “Category
void” (see Figure 4.2(g)).
1http://iiitd.ac.in/
2https://dev.twitter.com
3https://developers.facebook.com/docs/reference/api
4referred to as “description” in Twitter API https://dev.twitter.com/docs/platform-objects/users
5http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/nnp2003.pdf
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(a) Pattern 1: No space / dash in
mobile number
(b) Pattern 2: One dash after
country code
(c) Pattern 3: Two dashes
(d) Pattern 4: Three dashes (e) Pattern 5: One space after
country code
(f) Pattern 6: Two spaces
(g) Pattern 7: Dots between num-
bers
Figure 4.2: Various formats and patterns in which users posted Indian mobile numbers on OSNs. Mobile
numbers were prefixed with either trunk code ‘0’ or country code ‘+91’ while others had no prefix.
Table 4.1 shows the count of mobile numbers collected from tweets or bio on Twitter and public
posts or names on Facebook.
Numbers Category +91 Category 0 Category void
[Till Apr 20, 2013] Twitter Facebook Twitter Facebook Twitter Facebook
Mobile numbers 885 2,191 14,909 8,873 25,566 25,294
User profiles 1,074 2,663 17,913 9,028 31,149 25,406
Numbers Total
Twitter Facebook
Mobile numbers 41,360 36,358
User profiles 49,817 36,588
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the mobile numbers collected from Twitter and Facebook.
4.3 Data validation
Rule-based named entity recognition used to extract Indian mobile numbers from public posts
and bio in the earlier stage, relied on a set of regular expressions. Regular expressions in-
corporated Indian mobile number structure and therefore misinterpreted certain other country
number strings as Indian mobile numbers.
Mobile number format for few countries (United Kingdom, 6 Indonesia 7 and USA 8) is similar
to that of an Indian mobile number. UK mobile numbers are also 10-digit numbers starting with
07, which were confused as Indian mobile numbers prefixed with 0 and starting with 7. Few
6http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/telecoms/numbering/Numbering_Plan_October_2013.pdf
7http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telephone_numbers_in_Indonesia
8http://www.nanpa.com/enas/npaDialingPlansReport.do
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Indonesian mobile numbers are prefixed with 0881 / 0882 followed by a 7-digit mobile number
(depending on the operator e.g. PT Sinar Mas) making it a 10-digit mobile number, similar to
an Indian mobile number prefixed with 0 and starting with 8. USA mobile numbers also follow
10-digit format with first three digits representing area code, ranging from 2-9, therefore USA
mobile numbers without country code and with area codes starting with 7, 8, 9 are similar to
an Indian mobile number. Moreover, Category 0 and Category void numbers do not follow the
international mobile numbering format. Hence, we made them pass through a Data Validation
stage.
In Data Validation stage we used a service from http://trackmobileonline.co.in, which
checked if a number’s first four digits belonged to a valid Indian mobile number series. We
observed that 19,934 mobile numbers out of 23,405 in Category 0 (85%), and 42,360 numbers
out of 49,946 in Category void (85%), were marked as Indian mobile numbers by the service
(see Table 4.2).
Numbers Category 0 Category void
Passed Failed Passed Failed
Twitter 12,681 2,228 21,443 4,123
Facebook 7,586 1,287 21,715 3,579
Total 20,267 3,515 43,158 7,702
Table 4.2: Statistics of valid Category 0 and Category void Indian mobile numbers
On manual verification, we observed some non-Indian numbers were marked as ‘Passed’ by the
service. In order to avoid any bias or noisy inference by including Category 0 and Category void
numbers we considered only Category +91 mobile numbers for our analysis, since they were
confirmed to be Indian mobile numbers (follow International format). We keep validation and
analysis of Category 0 and Category void numbers as future work of this study.
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Chapter 5
Analysis
In this section, we present detailed analysis to understand mobile number sharing behavior on
OSNs.
5.1 Context analysis
We first attempt to comprehend the contexts in which mobile numbers were shared on OSNs.
To understand the context, we extracted most frequent words from the bio descriptions and
collected posts which shared the number. We removed stop words and performed stemming [35]
to avoid repeated forms of the same root word. Words were then supplied to a text analysis
software, LIWC. 1 LIWC returned the category associated with each word as well as ranking of
the categories to which most words belonged to.
Top-5 LIWC categories ranked in order of popularity on Twitter were ‘social’, ‘affect’, ‘cogmech’,
‘work’, ‘leisure’ while on Facebook ‘work’, ‘cogmech’, ‘social’, ‘time’ and ‘space’ were the top
ones. ‘Work’ category (words such as office, computer) was more popular on Facebook than
Twitter, while ‘leisure’, and ‘social’ category (words such as travel, apartments, music) were
more popular on Twitter than Facebook. ‘Time’ category was popular on both OSNs, however
in different contexts. On Twitter, ‘time’ category marked words such as urgency, need, now
while on Facebook, ‘time’ category marked official context words such as year, time, weekday.
To clearly understand the contexts, we manually analyzed word-clouds of the most frequent
words (see Figure 5.1(a) and 5.1(b)). We observed words such as blood, specialist, hospital,
love, sexy, escort, girl, music, movie, fun, offer, reservation, ticket, hotel, seo, sale, astrologer,
business in Figure 5.1(a). We infer that on Twitter, users post Indian mobile numbers, majorly
to ask for blood donations / aid, help in emergency situations, to promote escort business, to
promote entertainment, to market for travel, holiday, hotel packages, and to buy / sell products,
etc. Such a behavior is understandable since Twitter acts as a news media, and marketing
platform for most companies [28]. On Facebook, users posted Indian mobile numbers majorly
1http://www.liwc.net/
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(a) Twitter Tag-cloud (b) Facebook Tag-cloud
(c) Twitter Bio Tag-cloud (d) Facebook Name Tag-cloud
Figure 5.1: Figure 5.1(a) and 5.1(b) shows the context in which users leaked mobile numbers on Twitter
and Facebook. Users posted mobile numbers in context of emergency, escort services, entertainment,
marketing on Twitter while in context of IT facilities on Facebook. Figure 5.1(c) and 5.1(d) shows the
genre of users who shared Indian mobile number on Twitter and Facebook.
in context of Information Technology (IT) facilities and education related products, evident by
the presence of words such as price, hp, battery, dell, laptop, ibm, email, notebook, computer
(see Figure 5.1(b)). We infer that users post mobile numbers on social media platforms in order
to benefit from social network structure and promote their business by spreading the contact
information (mobile number) to large number of users.
5.2 Genre analysis
Context analysis gave an understanding that mobile numbers were leaked in different contexts,
however profession of users who predominantly posted mobile numbers is unclear. We now
attempt to understand the profession of the users who posted mobile numbers. Since, there
is no explicit attribute mentioning profession of a user on Twitter, 2 we created a word-cloud
of the description (bio) of the users, who shared mobile numbers either via public posts or in
their bio (see Figure 5.1(c)). We observed words as classified, free, ad, service, business, estate,
job, escort, company and infer that Twitter is heavily used by advertising sites, marketers and
business-oriented users and they intend to expand their business by enhancing reachability via
mobile numbers. Profession attribute of a user is not available publicly via Facebook API 3 as
well, so we created a word-cloud of names of users who have shared at least one Indian mobile
number via their public post (see Figure 5.1(d)). We chose names because no other attribute on
Facebook was publicly available with which we could extract profession of the users. We observe
2https://dev.twitter.com/docs/api/1
3https://developers.facebook.com/docs/reference/api/user/
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words as solution, computer, technology, education, institute, website, training, management, ad-
mission, helpline, love, astrologer, travel, photography, entertainment and infer that technology
experts, academicians, marketers and artists majorly post mobile numbers on Facebook.
5.3 Gender distribution
Privacy studies show that higher proportion of females (19%) consider mobile number as PII
as compared to males (10%) in India [27]. To understand if females were privacy conscious
while sharing mobile number on OSNs, we observed gender of the users who posted Indian
mobile numbers. We extracted gender of all the Facebook users using Facebook Graph API.
Since Twitter API does not have gender as profile attribute, we derived gender for only those
Twitter users who mentioned their Facebook identity on Twitter’s URL attribute. Table 5.1
shows detailed statistics of gender of users who shared mobile numbers. Less than 20% female
users leaked mobile numbers publicly on OSNs. This implies that females are conservative while
sharing mobile numbers on OSNs, inline to the observation in [27].
Facebook Twitter
Total users 2,663 1,074
Gender available (G) 1,438 29
Females (F) 220 6
Males (M) 1,218 23
Percentage (F / G) 15% 20%
Table 5.1: Gender distribution. Few females leak mobile numbers on OSNs as compared to males.
5.4 Ownership analysis
Exposure of mobile numbers by non-owners might lead to unwanted privacy leaks and annoyance
to their owners. 4 We therefore analyzed weather the mobile number owner himself posted his
number at the first place or someone else posted his number on online social network. For this
we used methodology shown in Figure 5.2.
For each mobile number collected from Twitter (885) and Facebook (2,191), we retrieved the
first tweet (post) from our dataset, sharing that mobile number on Twitter (or Facebook). The
mobile number was marked as ‘leaked by its owner’, if the tweet (post) included a first person
pronoun such as me, my, us, mera (my in English) along with most frequent action verbs such
as call, text, sms, ping, whatsapp, message, contact. For instance we checked for the presence of
phrases like - “call us”, “text us”, “my contact”. Figure 5.3(b) shows an example post where
owner himself leaked his mobile number, according to our detection technique. The mobile
number was marked as ‘leaked by a non-owner’, if the tweet (post) included second person
4http://thenextweb.com/media/2011/07/10/supposed-phone-number-of-news-internationals-chief-
executive-leaked-on-twitter
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Figure 5.2: Ownership Analysis Technique
(a) Mobile number posted by the owner of mobile number. (b) Mobile number posted by the non-owner
of mobile number.
Figure 5.3: Sample posts where mobile number is shared by 5.3(a) non-owner of the shared mobile
number and 5.3(b) owner of the shared mobile number
pronoun such as you, your, yours or third person pronoun such as his, her, them along with
same action verbs as used with first person pronouns before. Figure 5.3(a) shows an example
post of user (non-owner) leaking some other person’s mobile number, according to our detection
technique. Researchers used only pronouns to check for ownership [30], this may give false
positives like - “You may call me at xxx”, however we avoided it by using phrases here. We
compared the two algorithms, the results are presented toward the end of this section. We also
assumed that mobile numbers shared on Twitter via bio or on Facebook via name are users’
own mobile numbers.
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics of mobile numbers which were leaked by their owners
and non-owners. Two hundred and ninety one mobile numbers (32.8%) were shared by their
owners while only 18 mobile numbers (2.0%) were shared by non-owners on Twitter. Four
hundred and eighty seven mobile numbers (22%) were shared by owners, and 25 mobile numbers
(1.1%) were shared by non-owners on Facebook. Example post where owner shared his mobile
number is “F1 INR 2500/- tickets are available with me..!! Limited stocks..!! Ping me or call
me up on +91 989 xxx xxxx asap!” Example post where non-owner shared the mobile number
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is “@VodafoneIN My friend Debasrita took a new connection (+91-73816xxxxx), she is having
issues. Please contact her at +91-9556xxxxxx”. Exposure of mobile numbers by non-owners
might lead to unwanted privacy leaks and annoyance to their owners [4]. For remaining mobile
numbers, the methodology used could not infer if the numbers were shared by the owners or
non-owners. Example post is “Need a male punjabi artist of age 35 for a ad in #chennai pls
contact +91 98-41-xxxxxx.”
Social Network -
Source of leakage
Mechanism # Mobile
numbers
Twitter - Owner
Bio 155
Tweet 136
Twitter - Non-owner Tweet 18
Facebook - Owner
Message 422
Caption 38
Description 8
Name 17
Others 2
Facebook - Non-owner Message 25
Table 5.2: Mobile numbers shared by owners and non-owners on Twitter and Facebook. Most mobile
numbers were leaked by owners themselves, though few were leaked by non-owners.
In the past, researchers used only pronouns to check for ownership [30] however in our algorithm
we used phrasal level search 5.4. We now compare the performance of the two methods in
detecting if the mobile number owner shared his number himself or someone else shared it. We
evaluate both methods by comparing their results with human annotated ground truth dataset.
The ground truth dataset was prepared by manually tagging all the posts sharing mobile numbers
in the dataset, which also has a pronoun (basic condition needed by both methods to work).
The posts were tagged in accordance with - if they have mobile number(s) ‘shared by owner’,
or ‘shared by non-owner’. For some posts, it was hard for a human to understand if they were
posted by the owner or non-owner, such posts were tagged as - ‘ownership not clear’. Example
posts falling under the category - ‘ownership not clear’ were “@VodafoneIN +91843xxxxxxx
time of call 14:51 today and purpose ICICI bank credit card offer ... Can we check this ???”,
“@rusXXXXa oops sorry. I had just woken up. This is the correct number - +9198xxxxxxx4”.
We used false positive rate as a measure to compare the two methodologies. False positive rate
is the fraction of mobile numbers marked incorrectly by a method to the total mobile numbers
tagged by the same method. We report the result only for numbers whose ownership could be
disambiguated on manual tagging (they are not tagged as ‘ownership not clear’), on Twitter
we had 200 such numbers however on Facebook there were 861 such numbers. On Twitter, we
observed that the previous methodologies [30] had a false positive rate of 0.08% (16/200) and our
methodology 5.4 had a false positive rate of 0.01% (2/154). On Facebook, we observed that the
previous methodologies [30] had a false positive rate of 0.13% (109/861) and our methodology 5.4
had a false positive rate of 0.04% (19/495). The methodology we proposed 5.4 clearly performed
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better on both the OSNs, by having a lower false positive rate.
5.5 Topographical distribution
We probe into the location of the users, who shared Indian mobile numbers on OSNs, to un-
derstand if users of few locations more actively posted mobile numbers on social networks than
others. We analyzed geo-tagged posts which shared mobile numbers on both social networks.
We identified only 13 geo-tagged tweets on Twitter, where 9 unique users shared 12 mobile num-
bers, listed in Table 5.3. We did not find any geo-tags in Facebook public posts which shared
the number.
Location of user Location via bio of
user
Location via geo-
tagged posts
Country India, United States,
United Kingdom,
United Arabs, Canada
United States, In-
dia, Russia, Belgium,
Canada
India
State Maharashtra, Kar-
nataka, Delhi, Tamil
Nadu, Andhra Pradesh
Maharashtra, Texas,
Pennsylvania, Moscow
Federal City, California
Maharashtra, Karnataka,
Tamil Nadu, Delhi
City Delhi, Mumbai, Banga-
lore, Chennai, Hyder-
abad
Moscow, Mumbai,
Fallowfield, Taipei City,
Addison
Delhi, Mumbai, Mysore,
Coimbatore
Table 5.3: Top states and cities, from where most Indian mobile numbers were shared on OSNs.
With few geo-tagged tweets, we investigated whether location of the users who shared mobile
numbers can be estimated either via their ‘location’ attribute or bio description on Twitter [34].
We used Yahoo Maps 5 to trace a location, present in users’ location attribute or bio attribute,
to a city, state and country. We found location of 780 users via ‘location’ attribute and of 753
users via their bio description. We ignored locations which did not map to real geographical
locations like “Justin Beiber’s heart”. Table 5.3 shows the country, state and city from where
most Indian mobile numbers were shared, either via ‘location’ attribute or bio description. We
infer that mobile numbers were largely shared by users of urban cities in India.
We further looked at the location from where the leaked mobile numbers were issued. Indian
mobile numbers can be splitted up into 2 parts first part (1st four digits) represents the network
operator of which the number is part of and second part (last six digits) represents the subscriber
number. The first part can be used to infer the telecom zone/circle and hence the location from
where the number was issued. These telecom zones/circles are categorized into Metropolitan /
A / B / C circle. Metro circles are the ones with High population density. ‘A’ circle has largest
subscriber base, then ‘B’ circle and least is in ‘C’ circle. 6 With this background we looked
at the issue location of leaked mobile numbers (see Table 5.4). We found that most numbers
5http://developer.yahoo.com/maps/
6host.comsoc.org/sistersocieties/india iete/circles.pdf
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belonged to Indian metropolitan telecom circles and large cities ‘A’ circles. We also observed
that smaller circles like Punjab and Andhra Pradesh post more mobile numbers in comparison
to most of the bigger circles.
Telecom circle Category # of mobile
numbers
Delhi Metropolitan 582
Mumbai Metropolitan 312
Karnataka “A” Circle 233
Punjab “B” Circle 226
Rajasthan “B” Circle 171
Andhra Pradesh “A” Circle 164
Kerala “B” Circle 158
Maharashtra “A” Circle 140
Gujrat “A” Circle 135
Tamil Nadu “A” Circle 102
Kolkata “B” Circle 75
Uttar Pradesh (West) “B” Circle 75
Uttar Pradesh (East) “B” Circle 70
Madhya Pradesh “B” Circle 64
Haryana “B” Circle 37
Bihar & Jharkhand “C” Circle 35
West Bengal “B” Circle 31
Assam “C” Circle 28
Jammu & Kashmir “C” Circle 27
Himachal Pradesh “C” Circle 18
Orrisa “C” Circle 16
North East “C” Circle 8
Table 5.4: Telecom circle and count of mobile numbers associated with the circle in India. Most mobile
numbers which were exposed on OSNs, belonged to populated telecom circles.
We hypothesize that users of cities with higher Internet user base [2] are most active in sharing
mobile numbers on OSNs. To test the hypothesis, we calculated correlation between top-8 Indian
cities ranked by active Internet users [2] and top-8 Indian cities ranked by number of mobile
numbers shared on Twitter (location extracted from ‘location’ attribute as well as bio of a user).
We observed a positive correlation of 0.86, therefore we conclude that penetration of Internet
at an Indian location impacts number of mobile numbers shared from that location on social
media.
We present a lists of top 5 Telecom Operator and corresponding number of Category +91 mobile
numbers taking service from the operator in Table 5.5. The ranking corresponds to the top 5
operators (in accordance to subscriber base), 7 however Reliance has a larger subscriber base
than Vodafone.
7http://www.coai.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/All-India-GSM-figures-April-2013.xls
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Operator Frequency
Airtel 845
Vodafone 772
Reliance communications 255
Idea 223
BSNL 182
Table 5.5: Top 5 Mobile Number Operator of Category +91 numbers
Figure 5.4: Figure shows the devices / tools / apps used to post mobile numbers on social networking
sites. We observed other OSNs like Facebook, Google and LinkedIn are used to share mobile numbers,
implying users are not restricted to one social network, but are posting mobile numbers on multiple
networks. We also observed usage of 3rd party applications like Twitterfeed, which might be used to post
on multiple OSNs together, hence strengthening our argument.
5.6 Source analysis
Same mobile numbers posted from profiles coming from different social networks can be used
to find related accounts across social networks. To understand weather same number is posted
across different Social Networks, we inquired the source or application by which most mobile
numbers were posted on Twitter and Facebook (see Figure 5.4). To extract application used
to post the number, we extracted ‘source’ attribute of the tweet, available from Twitter API, 8
and ‘application’ attribute of the post, available from Facebook Graph API. 9 On Twitter,
apart from the web (234), mobile numbers were largely posted from social aggregators and
other social networks such as Facebook (148), Twitterfeed (121), Google (121), LinkedIn (50),
TweetDeck (22). We observed major use of social aggregators and other social networks to post
mobile numbers on Twitter indicating users might be sharing same mobile number not only on
one OSN but on multiple OSNs simultaneously. On Facebook, most numbers were posted by
Facebook mobile applications such as Facebook mobile (125), Facebook for iPhone (36 numbers),
Photos (34), Facebook for Android (19), and few by social aggregators such as HootSuite (31),
8dev.twitter.com/docs/platform-objects/tweets
9developers.facebook.com/docs/reference/api/post/
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and Twitterfeed (3). We observed major use of OS based Facebook mobile applications to post
numbers on Facebook with comparatively less exploitation of social aggregators.
We infer that users push the same information across multiple OSNs in order to increase audience
receiving the information. Out of 2,996 unique Category +91 numbers in our dataset, we found
80 mobile numbers were shared on both Twitter and Facebook. Note that, same mobile number
can be posted by many users using different applications.
5.7 Network analysis
To investigate if popularizing actions like posting the same number on multiple OSNs were effec-
tive, we analyzed networks formed by the dissemination of numbers on Twitter. Since Facebook
Graph API does not provide public access to a user’s friends / networks, we analyzed networks
for mobile numbers shared on Twitter. We constructed two networks, audience network and
dissemination network. We define audience network of a mobile number as a directed graph
GA(VA, EA), where nodes represent two kinds of users – publishers and consumers. Publishers
are users who shared the mobile number by posting or retweeting it, colored as black. Con-
sumers are users who received the mobile number in their timeline by following the publishers,
colored as orange. Edges represent the follower relationships between publisher and consumer,
colored as orange, labelled as 2. Follower relationship implies that a consumer is a follower of
a publisher (edge directed towards the follower). Using GA, one can analyze the nature and
volume of the audience users to whom the mobile number was presented in their timeline. Dis-
semination network of a mobile number is a directed graph GD(VD, ED) where nodes represent
only publishers of the mobile number and edges represent two kinds of relationships – follower
and retweet. Follower relationship implies that one publisher is a follower of other publisher,
colored as black, labelled as 1. Retweet relationship implies that one publisher retweets the post
of other publisher (edge directed towards the retweet publisher), colored as magenta, labelled as
3. GD helps in understanding the diffusion patterns of a mobile number among its publishers.
We selected three most popular mobile numbers (in terms of users sharing them, highest being 84
users sharing the same number) in each context, observed in Section 5.1– emergency, marketing,
escort business and entertainment. We explored the audience and dissemination networks for
these mobile numbers. We now report the detailed network analysis for emergency context
while mentioning briefly the inferences for other contexts. Emergency context includes scenarios
where mobile numbers were shared to ask for blood aid, and help. We observed that emergency
context was popular on Twitter but not on Facebook. Blood aid was the most popular mobile
number shared in the emergency context. The number was posted by few publishers (84) while
the information amplified to a wider audience (61,037), fulfilling the intention of popularizing
the number.
Audience network
Figure 5.5(a) shows the most popular mobile number shared in the emergency context. We
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(a) Emergency: Audience network (b) Entertainment: Audience network
(c) Marketing: Audience network (d) Escort: Audience network
(e) Emergency: Dissemination network (f) Entertainment: Dissemination network
(g) Entertainment: Dissemination
network
(h) Marketing: Dissemination network (i) Escort: Dissemination network
Figure 5.5: Audience and dissemination networks formed during most popular mobile number diffusion
for each context on Twitter – Emergency, Entertainment, Marketing, Escort business.
observed that audience network was a weakly connected component with high modularity (>
0.8, > 30 communities). Averaging for the three mobile numbers, average path length of the
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number numbers in the audience network turns out to be 3, average clustering coefficient was
0.023, and average diameter of the network was 6. We observed that high betweenness nodes,
were the publishers in the network. On observation of low clustering coefficient and large path
length for the three mobile numbers, we infer that audience networks of a mobile number, shared
in the context of an emergency, were loosely bound within one giant component and do not follow
small-world phenomena.
Dissemination network
Figure 5.5(e) shows the dissemination network for the most popular mobile number shared
in emergency corresponding to the audience network (Figure 5.5(a)). Most publishers in the
dissemination network were followers (70%) of other publishers, while few were retweet publishers
(30%). Large proportion of the mobile numbers shared in context of emergency were re-posted
and diffused in the network. The average clustering coefficient of the dissemination network
was 0.259 and average diameter was 4. Publishers in the dissemination network were closely
connected with each other.
We infer that users are sensitive towards emergency scenarios and intend to promote the in-
formation by posting the number themselves in their network. For some mobile numbers, we
observe that high degree nodes take up such posts (e.g. BloodAid) from normal users who
asked for help in emergency, allowing the penetration of information to wider audience. Fur-
ther, high modularity of audience network ensures that diffused information does not limit to a
strongly connected community but diffuse into multiple disjoint communities. Such a network
characteristic may be used by government agencies, disaster managers to curb rumors from the
network and propagate important information across various communities in the network via
active users connected together in a tight-knit component. Note that, the user sharing mo-
bile number has been benefitted by other users’ involvement in spreading the information via
tight-knit dissemination network.
Top num-
bers
Emergency Entertainment Escort business Marketing
Mobile
number 1
+91-98091-xxxxx +91-98151-xxxxx +91-99002-xxxxx +91-99002-xxxxx
Mobile
number 2
+91-99110-xxxxx +91-98551-xxxxx +91-99996-xxxxx +91-96600-xxxxx
Mobile
number 3
+91-99539-xxxxx +91-99292-xxxxx +91-97174-xxxxx +91-96500-xxxxx
Table 5.6: Top mobile numbers extracted for four contexts – Emergency, Entertainment, Escort Business
and Marketing.
We conducted similar analysis for other three contexts – entertainment, escort business and
marketing. In entertainment context, we observed only few users (as compared to emergency
context) re-posted or re-tweeted the most popular mobile number. Publishers of few popular
entertainment mobile numbers were well connected with each other via both follower relationship
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as well as retweet relationship (see Figure 5.5(g)), while for other mobile numbers, publishers
were majorly connected via retweet relationship (see Figure 5.5(f)). We infer that retweet
relationships were promising and were helpful in promotion of entertainment mobile numbers on
Twitter, however even the most popular mobile number did not propagate deep in the network.
In marketing context, publishers of the mobile numbers were neither connected to each other
and nor had overlapping follower networks (see Figure 5.5(h)). Therefore, marketing numbers
disseminate in disjoint networks with few common links among the publishers and fail to diffuse
deep in the network. In escort business context, only a few users posted mobile numbers, out
of which most users posted it after receiving it on their timeline (i.e. by following original
publisher). Less than 10% of the posts were retweets, implying that users are sensitive on the
tweets they should post to their followers (see Figure 5.5(i)). Most popular mobile numbers
shared in marketing and escort business context could not receive any intended attention from
the social media users.
We conclude that publishers benefit heavily when they share mobile numbers in the emergency
context. For other contexts, we do not observe active user participation in disseminating the
number and therefore the intent of the publisher to popularize the mobile number is not achieved.
We infer that users do not benefit as much as they expose themselves to risks associated with
sharing mobile numbers publicly on OSNs.
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Chapter 6
Risk Analysis
6.1 Risk assessment: Risk of collation
We now turn our focus to understand how publicly shared mobile numbers can be exploited to
gather critical and sensitive information about the owners. For this we conducted two experi-
ments.
6.1.1 Experiment 1: Collating data from OSNs, Truecaller and Open gov-
ernment data repository (OCEAN)
In this experiment we used two online services – Truecaller 1 and home-grown system OCEAN [14].
Truecaller allows to query a mobile number and returns the name of the owner as well as the
network operator. OCEAN, allows to query the name of a person with her finer location in New
Delhi (optional) and returns matching entries from publicly available e-government data sources
(voter rolls and driving licence records), listing Voter ID, family details, age, home address, and
father’s name. OCEAN has data only for New Delhi citizens.
We got manual annotators to extract data from Truecaller and OCEAN for Category +91 mobile
numbers. For each number, they were asked to observe name of the owner, and her location
from Truecaller, 2 along with the name of the owner, and her location from public posts and
profiles on OSNs, sharing the same number. Possible names of the mobile number owner and
her possible locations were inferred for 2,997 Category +91 numbers. Name of the owners whose
inferred location was New Delhi, were then used to query OCEAN and matching set of New
Delhi citizens were recorded. Surprisingly, out of annotated 94 New Delhi mobile numbers, we
were able to uniquely identify 8 New Delhi users with details like name, age, father’s name,
home location, gender, and voter ID (see Table 6.1). One of the identified users is a professional
Indian singer. He posted his number on Facebook and the number revealed other sensitive
information about him. We called all the 8 uniquely identified users to validate the information
1www.truecaller.com
2As per Truecaller policy, we did not store content from it.
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we had about them. Out of 8 people 2 users did not pick our call. From the remaining 6 users 1
user disagreed to answer our questions so we interviewed 5 users. Out of the 5 users only 1 said
that the information we had about her was incorrect, however rest confirmed the validity of the
information. The incorrect tracing is because the OCEAN system [14] we used to query user’s
detail did not have complete data about the citizens of New Delhi. The details of the interview
as well as the user’s reactions are reported in appendix 7. Aggregation of information extracted
from OSNs with the otherwise collected information about a New Delhi mobile number owner,
may lead to convenient identity theft attacks [5].
Details Shared by
owner?
Data source
+919873xxxxxx, X Kakrania, 24, Male, X Kakrania,
“B-***, B-block, X Vihar Ph-I, Delhi”, WHC17xxx63
Yes Facebook, True-
caller, Voter Roll
+9199xxxx2708, X Gambhir, 23, Male, X X
Gambhir, “***, xxxx Bagh, Delhi”, NLNxxx5696
No Facebook, True-
caller, Voter Roll
+918447xxxxxx, X Singh Nagi, 33, Male, X Singh
Nagi, “D-**-b, Block- D, X Vihar, X Ext.,
Nangloi”,IPN13xxx17
Yes Twitter, Truecaller,
Voter Roll
+9198xxxx5485, X X Jeswani Pankaj, 53, Male, X X
Jeswani, “***, Mig Flats, *-block, xxxxx Vihar
Phase-I”, DL/04/xxx/222668
Yes Facebook, True-
caller, Driving
licence records
Table 6.1: Anonymized mobile number, name, age, gender, father’s name, address, Voter ID of two New
Delhi residents who shared their mobile number on OSNs.
6.1.2 Experiment 2: Collating data from OSNs and WhatsApp
We experimented with an Android application, WhatsApp, 3 to understand if we could infer more
sensitive details like status message and last seen time of the owner of leaked mobile number,
and highlight novel significant risks. “Last seen time” is the last time when the application user
(mobile number owner) went online and accessed the application. To conduct the experiment we
used “Address book matching” feature of WhatsApp and followed the steps shown in Figure 6.1.
We added leaked mobile numbers to a phone’s contact directory and ran Whatsapp application
from the phone [21]. After this we could access 1,071 mobile number (out of 3,076) owner’s status
message and last seen time on WhatsApp i.e we observed a 34.8% penetration rate. Penetration
rate (prate) is calculated using following formula:
prate =
userexposed
usertotal
× 100 (6.1)
where userexposed is the number of user accounts exposed on another service and usertotal is the
total mobile numbers tested. Penetration rate indicates the percentage fraction of user accounts
exposed on another service (WhatsApp), hence an indicator of disclosure. Mobile numbers which
3http://www.whatsapp.com/
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Figure 6.1: Methodology to collect status message and last seen time of leaked mobile numbers on
WhatsApp.
can be connected to a social account brings greater risk to real world identity of its owner.
Users leaked variety of sensitive information via their Whatsapp status updates such as travel
plans, social network profile, BBM Pins, relationship status. Few examples of status updates are
“100% Single”; “No longer in India. UK: # +44 75xx 81xxxx US#610xxxxxxx as of June 10”;
“www.facebook.com/iakrfi***”; “New BBM Pin: 25C7xxxx”. This information further helps in
profiling a user.
We infer that an accidental / unintentional leak of mobile number on OSNs is capable of exposing
other sensitive information and thus creating a larger user’s digital footprint which may be used
against the individual. Beside having a larger footprint, previous literature has shown that the
mobile number owner can fall prey to impersonation attack, SMS spam attack, Phone number
enumeration attack and Status message forgery attack on WhatsApp, if the attacker just have
a mobile number in mind (the victim’s mobile number) [37].
6.2 Risk communication
With evident risks associated with leaking mobile numbers online, we attempted to communicate
the observed risks to mobile number owners. Researchers have suggested various channels for
risk communication e.g., Short Message Service (SMS) [11], and Interactive Voice Response
(IVR) system, 4 to communicate awareness information to its users. Online bloggers have also
deployed automated tools to display partially obfuscated mobile numbers onto a public web
page 5 and SMS with random texts, to publicly shared mobile numbers. 6 We deployed an IVR
system and communicated the risks associated with posting mobile number online by calling
the owners of the numbers. We chose IVR to ensure the reach to the owners and to convince
the credibility of the message to them. We now discuss the IVR deployment details, calling
procedure and users’ reactions to the calls.
4http://www.ddm.gov.bd/ivr.php
5http://www.weknowwhatyouredoing.com/
6http://textastrophe.com/
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6.2.1 IVR system design and implementation
We setted up an IVR system using FreeSWITCH 7 and a Java application (see Figure 6.2) to call
2,492 mobile numbers from Category +91, collected from earlier mentioned methodology until
28th February ’13. In India, we were not required to go through an Institutional Review Board
(IRB)-type approval process before calling the users. However, we applied similar practices in
this work. Prior to the actual risk communication part of the message, we informed the user
that an audio recording of the call would be taken only for research purposes. Furthermore,
participants were given options to disconnect the call and request the deletion of the audio
recording, at any given point of time during the call.
Java 
Application
Audio Files
Call Log
Mobile Number
Database
FreeSWITCH Gateway
Figure 6.2: IVR System Design implemented using FreeSWITCH and Java application.
When a callee answered the call, for credibility purposes, we introduced ourselves as researchers
from New Delhi. We then played the risk communicating message - “We found your number
on X”, where X was either “Facebook” or “Twitter” or “Facebook and Twitter”, depending
on the source from where we extracted the number of the callee. We then prompted a voice
message “Posting your number online is not a good practice. Doing so will make you fall prey
to various phone number frauds. Keep yourself safe and consider removing your number from
the Internet.” We intentionally kept the language simple as English is not a native language of
India and we had minimal information about the expertise level of the callee. We then presented
callee with the following options: “Press 1, If you did not know that your number can be leaked
and now you will remove it from the Internet; Press 2, If you posted it purposefully and you
will not remove it from the Internet; Press 3, if you want to hear the message again.” If the user
pressed either 1 or 2, we requested him to leave us a feedback and later gave him an option to
end the call. We informed the user that we recorded the call for research purposes and logged
all responses and activities of callees in a database. We made the calls during weekdays from
1100hrs IST to 1600hrs IST.
6.2.2 User reactions
Figure 6.3 shows how callees collectively reacted at each stage during the call. Sixty one percent
of callees who picked the call, opted to listen to the message and six percent chose to remove
7https://wiki.freeswitch.org/wiki/IVR
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their mobile numbers from OSNs. An equivalent percentage (6.2%) chose not to remove their
numbers. Forty seven users from the 2,492 numbers that we called, left feedback on our IVR
system.
Call 
mobile number
Call 
not picked
Call 
picked
Listen to 
message
Disconnect call
Call 
not picked
Listen to 
options
Disconnect call
Option 1 Option 2 Disconnect call
Leave Feedback Disconnect call
Disconnect call
0.35
(867)
0.65
(1625)
0.61
(988)
0.39
(637)
0.48
(479)
0.52
(509)
0.21
(107)
0.20
(102)
0.23
(47)
0.77
(60)
1.0
(47)
0.59
(300)
Figure 6.3: Callee Decision Tree. Each stage in the call is associated with a probability and the number
of users who chose that stage.
User Comments
We received 47 comments from the mobile number owners, we called. In some of the feedback
user’s voice wasn’t clear or we couldn’t hear anything at all. We could understand 26 of them.
Following are the broad categories of the comments:
“Thank you for information”
All 26 users found the message to be informative and some of them expressed their gratitude
to us, for making them aware of the risk of sharing mobile numbers on online social networks.
One example feedback was - “Thank you so much for this very valuable feedback. Bye.”
“I want to know how to remove my number”
Four callees showed their concern and requested us to help them to remove their numbers from
the Internet. One example feedback is - “I want to know how to remove my number and I don’t
know, I haven’t put my number purposely but if it is there, where exactly it is there I would
also like to know that. Please get in touch with me asap. Thank you.”
28
“I have deleted, I will not post my number online”
Five callees showed their concerns and proactively removed/promised to remove their mobile
number from online social network. One example feedback is - “Thank you for information, I
have deleted, I will not post my number online.”
Such user reactions urge the necessity for a safeguard solution to control the spread of personal
and sensitive information on OSNs.
“I posted my number purposely for my website promotion”
Three callees admitted that they shared their number for promoting their business or some other
purposes. One example feedback is - “I posted my number purposely for my website promotion,
I usually do deal in web hosting business so that is why I want someone to contact me for hosting
services.”
Detailed callee reactions/feedback, on receiving the call and listening to the message, spreading
awareness about risks of sharing mobile numbers on social media are listed in Appendix Table 7.2
6.3 Understanding user’s response
To understand the dynamics of callee’s response during the call we looked back at his actual
actions (posting mobile number on OSNs). For this we created a set containing all the posts
associated with the 107 numbers, whose owners chose option 1, that is they did not know that
their number can be leaked and they will remove it from the web. Then we did ownership
analysis on the posts present in the set 5.4. We found 38.3% (41/107) of mobile numbers were
posted by the owner of the number and 0.1% (9/107) mobile numbers were posted by non-owner
of mobile number. Fifty seven tweets during the ownership analysis remained uncategorized.
We observed a disconnect between what users say and what they did. From ownership analysis
we found that 38.3% (41/107) of mobile numbers were posted publicly by their owners, however
the owners when contacted said that they did not know that their number can be leaked. A
possible reason for this disconnect could be inability of users to manage their privacy settings [40]
or inadvertent disclosure of personal information (mobile number) is also common on online
social networks. 8
We manually tagged the context of all posts in the set we created. We found that 64.5% (69/107)
of mobile numbers were posted for marketing purposes and the remaining 35.5% were posted in
non-marketing context. Marketing context is associated with the post when the intent of the
post is to sell or promote something. We called the 8 people whom we uniquely identified to get
further insights on the behavior.
8http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-2072823/Charlie-Sheen-tweets-phone-number-
accident-trying-message-Justin-Bieber.html
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Chapter 7
Discussion, Limitations and Future
work
In this work, we examined the exposure of Indian mobile numbers on OSNs via profile and
public posts and investigated the associated privacy risks. We collected 76,347 Indian mobile
numbers shared on Twitter via tweets or bio and on Facebook via public posts or names and
analyzed 2,997 Indian numbers prefixed with +91. Most mobile numbers were shared to ask
for blood help, to market astrology business, IT facilities, and escort services. We observed
few posts where numbers were shared in personal contexts like “My contact no in India is
+91-9958xxxxxx”, however posts used for personal contexts had few context specific keywords,
therefore, personal contexts were difficult to highlight. Males posted their mobile numbers more
as compared to females. Users posted same numbers on multiple online social networks and a
few of them exploited social aggregators to popularize the number. Though owners promoted
mobile numbers via varied methods, most of them did not diffuse deep in the OSN. We observed
low benefits but high risks with presence of mobile numbers on OSNs. Sensitive and identifiable
information such as Voter ID could be extracted with the use of mobile number and other
information sources. However, we acknowledge that such additional information disclosure using
a mobile number, is subjective in nature. To communicate the risks and vulnerabilities, we called
2,492 numbers with an IVR setup and received feedback. Few users did not know about the
presence of their mobile number on OSNs while few told us that they intentionally put it to
publicize their business.
Database used in the study might also contribute towards solving entity resolution problem,
particularly the problem of linking multiple online profiles of a user, to certain extent. But we
also suspect that the models leveraging such information might not be generalizable.
Other identifiable information on OSNs such as Blackberry Messenger Pins (BBM), and email
addresses, can also help in accurate identification of their owners. 1 We infer that though mobile
numbers in India are heavily shared for non-personal contexts (e.g. marketing, emergency),
1We also collected BBM pins and email addresses shared on OSNs.
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such a behavior may invite unwanted spammers / calls to marketers themselves. For instance,
Textastrophe 2 pings marketers who post their mobile numbers on public places, hence waste
productive hours of the marketer by making inappropriate requests. Textastrophe posts the
conversation publicly to demonstrate that leaking mobile numbers may invite unwanted, invalid
and untimely requests for marketers too. OSNs do not provide safeguard mechanisms to disallow
sensitive and identifiable information exposure via either profile or public posts. There is a need
to build technological, people and process oriented solutions to forewarn users and raise the
awareness towards risks of mobile number leaks, so that users can make better decisions.
Research communities and industries have been developing technologies and techniques to com-
bat email based phishing attacks. However not much work has been done to prevent vishing
attacks (voice phishing). Vishing attacks are difficult to detect and stop before they cause
harm. Hence it is important to forewarn users and raise awareness amongst them about such
attacks. So, in this study we focused on mobile numbers and communicated risks associated to
its disclosure to the mobile number owners by setting up an IVR system.
We recognize the limitations of our data collection methodology and analysis. During our
keyword selection phase, we used a limited set of keywords to extract posts with mobile numbers
from OSNs, and refined keyword set only once. We leave the implications of iterative keyword
refinement on the quality of the dataset for future work. During our analysis, we used LIWC
tool to tag the words and extract the most frequent categories in which mobile numbers were
shared. Unclear and overlapping categories in LIWC output pushed us to manually tag the
words, to extract most common contexts in which mobile numbers were shared on OSNs. There
is a possibility of self-bias while extracting contexts from words. Our network analysis is limited
to Twitter, since Facebook Graph API does not provide public access to users’ friends. In future,
we plan to analyze Category 0 and Category void numbers to understand their characteristics
and examine if the characteristics differ from those of Category +91. We expect future studies
to understand impact of geographical, cultural differences, and user personality traits on the
practice of sharing mobile number.
2http://textastrophe.com/
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Appendix
Keywords to pull posts having mobile numbers from Twitter and
Facebook
We used Twitter stream API along with a list of keywords to pull public data from Twitter
shown in Table 7.1.
Keywords
working phone number, my info, please call, send your number, sms me, mera number, number, call, available, reachable,
contact, mobile, cellphone, phone, telephone, ring, cellular, directory, communicate, dial, pick, beep, buzz, get back, report,
email, phno, reach, interact, connect, touch, blackberry, bbn, ph, mob, num, no., whatsapp, answer, ans, text, message,
msg, track, numbr, ph:, cell, RSVP, lost my number, phnum, reach, interact, check with, get free gifts +91, get money,
free cards call now, call now, sell, carpool contact, carpool call, carpool mumbar call, carpool sms, sexy +91, lost, mms
+91, sms +91, sale +91, buy +91, discount +91, information +91, festival +91, competition +91, college event +91,
my number is +91, call me at, contact +91, proposal and presentation +91, numerologist +91, hotel +91, photographer
+91, exhibition +91, free dicount +91, studio +91, advocate +91, advocate 0, astrologer 0, artist +91, artist 0, insurance
91, insurance 0, fashion 0, radio 0, fashion +91, radio +91, astrologer +91, call @ +91, lost my number, my phone
number, text me, +91, my new number, girls number, mob:, number:, call this number, cell number +91, sell number
+91, lost all contacts, sexy boys number, buy number, GSM number +91, emergency call +91, number +91 free gifts,
discount number, sale phone number, sexy girls number, check with, ring on 91, call me 91, contact me 91, calling card
91, contact +91, urgently +91, blood aid +91, bloodaid +91, blood +91, register +91, helpdesk +91, urgeny +91, escort
+91, male +91, house +91, rent +91, molvi +91, magic +91, relief +91, project +91, love +91, event +91, company
+91, prayers +91, plz +91, please +91, interview +91, street +91, offer +91, christmas +91, carpool contact +91,
carpool sms +91, sexy +91, lost +91, my number is +91, call me at +91, proposal and presentation +91, numerologist
+91, hotel +91, photographer +91, exhibition +91, studio +91, advocate +91, astrologer +91, artist +91, insurance
+91, fashion +91, radio +91, astrologer +91, call @ +91, contact +91, lost my number +91, my phone number +91,
text me +91, +91, my new number +91, girls number +91, mob: +91, number: +91, call this number +91, cell number
+91, sell number +91, lost all contacts +91, sexy boys number +91, buy number +91, GSM number +91, emergency
call +91, free gifts +91, work phone number +91, my info +91, please call +91, discount number +91, sale phone
number +91, sexy girls number +91, send your number +91, sms me +91, mera number +91, number +91, available
+91, reachable +91, mobile +91, cellphone +91, phone +91, telephone +91, cellular +91, directory +91, communicate
+91, dial +91, pick +91, beep +91, buzz +91, get back +91, report +91, reach +91, interact +91, ring on +91, call me
+91, contact me +91, calling card +91, contact +91, sevice +91, hot girls +91, connect +91, touch +91, blackberry
+91, bbn +91, ph +91, mob +91, num +91, no. +91, whatsapp +91, answer +91, ans +91, text +91, message +91,
msg +91, track +91, numbr +91, ph: +91, cell +91, RSVP +91, lost my number +91, ring +91, cellular +91, directory
+91, communicate +91, dial +91, pick +91, beep +91, buzz +91, get back +91, report +91, email +91, phno +91,
phnum +91, reach +91, interact +91, check with +91, sale +91, buy +91, discount +91, information +91, guru +91,
vashikaran +91, sevice +91, festival +91, competition +91, college event +91
Table 7.1: Keywords used to pull data from Twitters Stream API and Facebook Graph API. Italicized
words were initial 50 keywords.
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User feedback
Users left us the following feedbacks:
I wasn’t aware about the activity as I posted, so did my friends. I didn’t know about the side effects of the number.
Thank you
thanks
It is a very nice process that you are doing and making people aware about online frauds and telephone number frauds
but your system is basically selling business houses where phone numbers need to be present online, so you need to
improve upon your system
Yeah thank you
Thanks for informing
Thank you so much for this very valuable feedback. Bye
Thank so much for the information, I will remove it from a Facebook account. Thank you so much
Please guide me what to do. Actually, I don’t know what is the procedure and what is the system
Hello already posted my number for gmail columns, I will remove it from the internet. Thank you
I am not getting your point properly
Hello *******
I didn’t know that my number is there on Facebook. Kindly delete it
I will delete it
Mam thank you for information, I have deleted, I will not post my number online. Thank you for the information
Please remove this * my number
Yeah hi got a call from Precog from * I didn’t get anything could you make me a call and give me a proper details.
Thank you
Yes I have posted my mobile no for some kind of purpose. Thanks
I want to how to remove my number and I don’t know, I haven’t put my number purposely but if it is there where
exactly it is there I would also like to know that. Please get in touch with me asap. Thank you
I dont want my number to be post in Facebook, yeah
Hello I have posted my number on Facebook * I will be getting the Facebook updates * on the mobile number
I registered my cell number on the internet forum * purpose of business and thanks for remember remind me and aware
me about the disadvantage of the registration of this cell number on internet but I not aware, I want to be registered
my number, I want to be continued on internet due to my business purpose and thanks for informing. In fact i didn’t
know that number shouldn’t be given. I am sorry for that. Thank you
I posted my no purposely for my website promotion, I usually do deal in web hosting business so i like,thats a I want
someone to contact me for like hosting services and all
Hello my name is *** and my number is *** I have purposely given my number in Facebook, it is because of the reason
that I am running a business and my business involves with some marketing strategies as well for which I want clients
to give me a feedback or either call me up regarding works that I did with them, So I have purposely given this and I
wont like to remove my number. Thank you
Hi, I am in a, I have a very small company. The name of the company silver * . So I have posted this number on
Facebook. Hello
I will do this *** from the Twitter
Thank for your suggestion
Table 7.2: User Feedback
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Interview Details
We called all the 8 subjects whom we were able to uniquely identify 6.1.1 to validate the in-
formation we had about them. When a callee answered the call, for credibility purposes, we
introduced ourselves as researchers from Precog at IIIT-Delhi. We then told them – “We found
your number on X”, where X was either “Facebook” or “Twitter” or “Facebook and Twitter”,
depending on the source from where we extracted the number of the callee. We then requested
them to help us in our research by saying – “We will be grateful if you can help us in our re-
search. We assure you that we will not use your details for any unauthorized purpose”. Then we
asked questions confirming their personal details we had about them. After this we enquired if
they posted their number purposefully on OSNs and why. We also asked if they plan to remove
their number from the internet and why. After this we thanked them for their responses and
communicated how risky can it be when they share their number on OSN by saying - “We in-
ferred all the details from your public social media profile and public e-government sources. We
hope that now you understand that posting your number online is not a good practice. Doing
so might make you fall prey to various phone number frauds. Keep yourself safe and consider
removing your number from the internet”. Later we asked if they have any feed back for us and
ended the call after taking the feedback and answering all the questions, if they had any.
Out of 8 people 2 users did not pick our call. Out of the remaining 6 users 1 user disagreed to
answer our questions so we interviewed 5 users. From the 5 users only 1 said that the information
we had about her was incorrect, however rest confirmed the validity of the information. The
incorrect tracing is because the OCEAN system [14] we used to query user’s detail did not have
complete data about the citizens of New Delhi.
Of the users we interviewed, two users expressed concern and said they only wanted to share their
number with friends and relatives. On knowing about the possible leakage and associated risks,
they decided to remove their number. One user also went ahead and called his service provider
and confirmed that we can very easily block his number and do much more with the information
we had. The user said that he shared his number so that his customers can reach him, however
he understood the risks associated to it and requested for possible countermeasures in such a
situation. He also suggested that the mobile service providers can use a stronger authentication
technique like asking questions on last recharge details or last service detail from the customer.
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